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THE IMPACT OF TERRORIST BOMBINGS ON THE MARKET VALUES OF 
HOSPITALITY AND TOURISM ENTERPRISES: GLOBAL EVIDENCE FROM 
TURKEY, SPAIN AND INDONESIA 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The last two decades witnessed numerous international terrorism incidents, some of which were 
specifically aimed at tourists or were at least intended to hamper visitor inflows.  However, there 
is no empirical evidence explaining and measuring the effect of terrorist attacks on the market 
value of tourism enterprises.  This study looked at the effect of the recent terrorist bombings in 
Bali (Indonesia), Istanbul (Turkey), and Madrid (Spain) on the market values of publicly traded 
hospitality and tourism firms in these countries.  The findings indicate that, overall, markets 
reacted negatively to these tragic events but reaction in Turkey was milder than in Spain. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The last two decades witnessed numerous international terrorism incidents, some of 
which were specifically aimed at tourists.  The terrorist attacks against international tourists in 
Egypt and TWA hijacking incident in 1992, the nightclub bombing of Bali, Indonesia in October 
2002, terrorist bombings in Casablanca, Morocco in May 2003, are some of the examples.  Even 
the terrorist events of September 11, 2001 affected the tourism industry since commercial 
airplanes were involved in the incidents.  These tragic events resulted in the loss of billions of 
dollars in lost revenues to the global hospitality industry.  
Wall (1996) claimed that tourism is an effective target for terrorists who wish to proclaim 
their goals worldwide.  Their effectiveness can be attributed to the fact that tourist destinations 
are visited by people from multiple nations and thus targeting tourists ensures global media 
coverage (Pizam & Mansfield, 1996).  Wall (1996) believed that with such attacks, the terrorist 
not only achieves global coverage but also causes a direct negative impact on the economic base 
of the target country, as tourists immediately react to these events and cancel their reservations 
and choose alternative destinations.  Therefore, one way to assess the economic impact of a 
terrorist attack (at the macro level) has been to by compare tourist arrival data in the event year 
to the previous years’ data.  Although several equity analysts conjecture that industries such as 
tourism, transportation and insurance are more vulnerable to terrorist attacks, the empirical 
evidence of these events on stocks of these industries in developing countries is not known. 
Purpose 
This study attempts to fill the void in the literature by assessing the effect of terrorist 
bombings on the market value of hospitality and tourism enterprises.  Thus, the purpose of this 
study is to investigate the effect of the recent terrorist bombings in Bali (Indonesia), Istanbul 
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(Turkey), and Madrid (Spain) on the market values of publicly-traded hospitality and tourism 
establishments in these countries.  This study investigates whether investors reacted negatively to 
the terrorist attacks in these countries and if they did, to what extent.  To achieve this objective 
this paper uses event study analysis to determine whether there was an "abnormal" stock price 
effect associated with the terrorist bombings. 
 
TOURISM AND TERRORISM 
In the recent years the world has seen an abundance of terrorist events that ranged from 
plane hijackings to bombing of buildings, facilities and transportation networks.  International 
terrorist attacks increased from an average of about 342 a year between 1995 and 1999 to 387 a 
year between 2000 and 2001 (Gupta, Clements, Bhattacharya, & Chakravarti, 2004; U.S. 
Department of State, 2002).  The literature documented that some of these events have 
considerable economic effects not only on the local economy but also on the other countries 
across the globe.  Terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 are arguably the best example of a 
global impact of such an event. 
  In terms of regional or local level impact, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) studied the 
Basque Country region of Spain.  The authors of that study faced a challenge of isolating the 
effects of terrorism by comparing a Basque Country region (a region affected by terrorism) to 
another region that matched its economic conditions (“synthetic region”) and was not affected by 
terrorist attacks.  Abadie and Gardeazabal reported that the Basque Country and the synthetic 
region behave similarly until 1975.  However, starting in 1975, when Euskadi Ta Askatasuna’s 
(ETA) terrorist activity became a large-scale phenomenon, they diverge. The authors further 
stated that after the outbreak of terrorism in the 1970s, per capita GDP in the Basque region of 
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Spain declined by about 10% relative to a "synthetic" control region, and that this gap widened 
in response to increase in terrorist activity.   
Some other studies have empirically assessed the impact of terrorism on tourism, both 
domestic and regional, and have found the expected negative effect (Drakos & Kutan, 2001; 
Enders & Sandler, 1991; Enders & Parise, 1992). In 2001, Drakos and Kutan conducted study 
that encompassed Greece, Israel, and Turkey, and used Italy as a "control variable.”  The authors 
found that the intensity (measured by number of casualties) of terrorist incidents had significant 
domestic and cross-country effects on the market shares of the affected countries, and that there 
are significant contagion effects from terrorism within the region. 
There are numerous ways of categorizing terrorism events which can based on 
geographic location, target type, and by the attack type (e.g. killing oneself,  killing others 
(suicide), cold weapon, armed assault, bombing, kidnapping and other; by the total number of 
people injured and killed (Eldor & Melnick, 2004).  Drakos and Kutan (2001) stated that their 
findings indicate the importance of decomposing terrorist incidents into different categories to 
truly identify the impact of effects on the tourism market shares of involved countries.  Using 
their argument as a starting point this study aims to look at the terrorist attacks where damage 
was caused by “bombing” buildings, facilities or public transportation.  Although there may be 
several events that may fall into this category, three of them emerge as the most important and 
the most recent: namely, night club bombings in Bali (Indonesia), bombings of a British bank 
branch (HSBC) in Istanbul (Turkey), and the train bombing in Madrid (Spain). It is important to 
note that all these events occurred in a post-September 11 environment and they are expected to 
have more severe impact than the terrorist attacks prior to September 11, 2001, ceteris paribus. In 
addition, a report published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
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(OECD) advocates that close attention needs to be paid to the medium-term consequences of 
terrorism. The report contends that measures to reduce the risk and the economic consequences 
of further attacks should be both security-effective and growth-friendly for the economy (Lenain, 
Bonturi & Koen, 2002).  
         
                       DESCRIPTION OF EVENT STUDY AND ITS APPLICATIONS 
 Pioneered by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969), event 
studies have been used as a powerful tool in assessing the effect of an event on price of common 
stocks and thus on firms’ market values (Seiler, 2000).  MacKinlay (1997) states that the 
usefulness of the event studies comes from the fact that given the rationality in the equity 
markets, the effects of an event will be reflected immediately in security prices.  Thus, using a 
relatively short period of time covering security prices one can construct a measure of the event’s 
economic impact. 
 Essentially the event study method identifies an event that has occurred in a firm's life, 
isolates the event from all others, and measures its impact on share price.  This is accomplished 
by first predicting what would ordinarily have happened to share price in the absence of the 
event.  This value represents the "normal" return to the stock and it is compared to what actually 
happens to the share price during the period when the event is unfolding.  The difference 
between these two values constitutes the "abnormal" return or the additional wealth created (or 
destroyed) for the shareholder as a result of the event (Kwansa, 1994).  
 The basis of studies relating to the behavior of stock returns is the proposition that the 
distribution of stock returns follows a normal distribution.  That is, given a specific interval (a 
day, a week, or a month) if the number of transactions involving a particular stock is large, then 
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the price changes which occur during the interval will reflect many independent, identically 
distributed drawings.  Thus, using the central limit theorem, the distribution of a sum of 
independent, identically distributed intermediate price changes will generally reflect a normal 
distribution as the number of items in the sum increases. 
 The hypothesized behavior of a stock's return is made in the context of the market return. 
That is, the relationship between an individual stock's return and the return of a market portfolio 
is assumed to be bivariate normal.  The expected return of the stock is given by:  
E(Rit) = αi +  βiRmt  
where, E(
 
Rit)is the expected return of stock i, αi    is the intercept, βi = cov (Rit,Rmt)/ var (Rmt) is 
the relative
 
risk, and Rmt  is the market return.  If the stock returns are normally distributed, the 
deviation of a return from its expected value (the residual) is also expected to be normally 
distributed with a mean of zero and variance δ2 (εit).   The deviation is represented as:  
εit = (Rit) - (αi +βiRmt), 
where, εit represents the residual or error term.  Thus, assuming that the joint distribution of a 
stock return and the market return is bivariate normal, then the relationship between the two 
returns is:  
Rit = αi +  βiRmt + εit 
where, the residual term is normally distributed with a mean zero.  This equation is referred to as 
the market model (Kwansa, 1994) and was used in this study.  Hence, the abnormal return (AR) 
can be computed as: 
AR= Rit - (αi + βi Rm) 
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where, αi and βi are the estimates obtained from the regression of R it over Rmt over an estimation 
period preceding the event window.  As a last step, the ARs are cumulated in order to obtain the 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for the event period. 
 MacKinlay (1997) points out that the use of other models is dictated by data availability. 
Thus, he proposes that in cases when data are limited, market-adjusted model return can be used 
as a normal performance return model.  In essence, the market adjusted return model can be 
viewed as a restricted market model with αi  constrained to be zero and βi constrained to be one.  
Since model coefficients are pre-specified, an estimation period is not required to obtain 
parameter estimates. 
Event study has found numerous applications in the finance and accounting fields.  Some 
examples include earnings announcements, issuance of new equity, CEO changes, corporate 
spin-offs, and merger and acquisitions.  In the hospitality and tourism fields this method has been 
used by several researchers including: mergers and acquisitions (Andrew, 1988; Kwansa, 1994; 
Sheel & Nagpal, 2000), dividend announcements (Borde, Byrd, & Atkinson, 1999), spin-offs 
(Canina & Klein, 1998), hotel openings (Nicolau, 2002), earthquakes (Mazocchi & Montini, 
2001) and casino-hotel fires (Sprecher & Pertl, 1988). 
Event Types 
There are two important dimensions that describe the events that affect the corporate 
firms.  The first dimension is negative-positive dimension in which the event can be solely 
negative, solely positive, or an event that can be either positive or negative. The examples for the 
positive-negative dimension are: events that can be either positive or negative (dividend 
announcements, earnings announcements), solely positive events (introduction of a new product, 
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capital investment announcement) and solely negative events (plane crash, plant explosion, hotel 
fires, and earthquakes) (Brooks, Patel, & Su, 2003).   
The other dimension of events can be called anticipated-unanticipated.  Some of the 
examples for the anticipated-unanticipated dimension are: anticipated events (macroeconomic 
announcements e.g. inflation, consumer confidence, interest rate) and unanticipated events (e.g. 
death of a CEO, plane crash, plant fire).  Since the events analyzed in the present article are 
unanticipated it is expected that the market will overreact to the negative news (Brown, Harlow, 
& Tinic, 1988; De Bondt & Thaler, 1985, 1987) and later there may be some correction or 
adjustment in the stock prices. 
To date, there are two studies that focused on unanticipated negative events in the 
hospitality industry.  Those are the MGM Grand casino-hotel fire in 1980 in Las Vegas, Nevada 
(Sprecher & Pertl, 1988) and the earthquake of that occurred in Umbria, Central Italy on 
September 26, 1997 (Mazocchi & Montini, 2001).  The study related to the MGM looked at the 
intra-industry effects of this fire that caused several hundred million dollars in damage.  Yet, the 
findings demonstrated that the investors did not perceive this as an event that will affect the 
future cash flows of casino hotels.  Put in other words, the costs borne by the additional 
insurance costs and preventive measures were believed to have a minor impact on the casino-
hotel firms. 
 The second study, which assessed the impacts of the earthquake on the tourism inflows, 
used tourism arrival data instead of capital markets data.  Mazocchi and Montini (2001) looked 
at the residuals between forecasted and realized tourist arrivals of 12 districts in Umbria, Central 
Italy.  The authors called the residuals “missing arrivals” that occurred due to the earthquake of 
1997.  Gubbio, Assisi, and Foligno were closest to the epicenter of the earthquake and were 
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affected most severely by this event.  Additional factors that contributed to the drop in tourist 
visits were the availability of the historical monuments and the increased media coverage in 
these districts. 
METHODOLOGY 
 This paper uses event study guidelines suggested by MacKinlay (1997).  The research 
uses a three-step approach provided below: 
1. Event Definition 
 McWilliams and Siegel (1998) pointed out that event definition is probably the most 
critical stage in conducting an event analysis.  The researchers stated that the following 
requirements should be met in order to assess the viability of the event study: 
a) First, define the event of interest and verify the event date(s) in the published press. In this 
study three independent events are defined and verified using written media sources:  
Event 1: A bomb on the Indonesian holiday island of Bali has killed at least 58 people in a 
crowded nightclub in the resort of Kuta (October 12, 2002) (BBC News, 2002). 
Event 2a:“Car bombs exploded at 10’o clock in the morning on November 15, 2003 in Istanbul 
and killed at least 20 and wounded 257 people” (BBC News, 2003a). 
Event 2b: Bomb attacks on the British consulate and the HSBC bank headquarters in Istanbul 
have left at least 27 dead and up to 400 injured (November, 20, 2003) (BBC News, 2003b). 
Event 3: One hundred and ninety-eight people died and a further 1,400 were injured on Thursday 
(March 11, 2004) when bombs exploded in quick succession on packed commuter trains during 
Madrid's morning rush hour” (BBC News, 2004a). 
b) Second, the researcher needs to ascertain that there are no other confounding effects from 
other events such as dividend declarations, signing of a major government contract, and changes 
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in the executive board that may explain the changes in market value.  The present study did not 
detect any other confounding events. 
c) Third, define the length of the event window. In this study, the events for Spain and Indonesia 
lasted three days (0, +2) and five days for Turkey (+1,+4) (due to the occurrence of the second 
bombing) where day 4 (+4) is the day of that event. 
2. Selection Criteria 
 The publicly traded hospitality (hotel and restaurant), tourism, transportation, and real 
estate companies (that own hotels) listed on one of the following stock exchanges: Istanbul Stock 
Exchange (IMKB), Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSE) and Madrid Stock Exchange (IBEX) and have 
market data for at least 151 days before the event and 30 days after the event were selected for 
the analysis.  Thus, 10 Indonesian, 11 Turkish, and 9 Spanish companies were selected for the 
analysis. 
3. Normal and Abnormal Returns 
 Estimation period for normal returns was defined as 120 days before the beginning of the 
pre-event period (-30, -1), (MacKinlay, 1997).  This study uses the market model to calculate the 
size of the abnormal returns.  Market model denotes that the return on a security depends on the 
return on the market portfolio and the extent of the security's responsiveness as measured by 
beta.  For all stocks, day 0 represented the event day (in this case, the terrorist bombing(s)) and 
day +1 was the day after the event day and so on. 
 It should be noted that, during the process of the study, the researchers faced two critical 
challenges.  In the case of Indonesian stocks, the severe asynchronous trading prevented the 
authors from conducting an event study analysis for this terrorism event.  On the other hand, the 
estimation period for Turkish stocks (-151 through -31) demonstrated that stock returns in that 
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period were not normal.  As a result, market-adjusted return was used in lieu of market model to 
remedy this problem as suggested by MacKinlay (1997) and Ritter (1991). 
FINDINGS 
 The results indicated that the Spanish hospitality and tourism stocks recorded negative 
abnormal returns for all of the three observed days (0, 1, and 2) (see Table 1).  The largest 
abnormal return occurred during day 2 (-3.06%).  The t-values for all event days were significant 
at .05 level which indicated that hospitality and tourism investors reacted negatively to the 
bombing events in Madrid.  The terrorism event resulted in a negative Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR) of -5.74% (p < .05) for the portfolio of publicly-traded tourism and hospitality 
firms in Spain. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE   
 
 
As it was stated in the previous finance research, the investors tend to overreact to 
negative unanticipated events.  In order to evaluate whether this is the case for the terrorist 
bombings in Spain a graph showing the ARs was plotted (See Figure 1).  As the results 
indicated, there was a considerable correction in the stock prices of the hospitality and tourism 
portfolio after day 10.  However, even after 30 days the negative cumulative abnormal return 
remained around 2%.  This implies that the decrease in the market values of the publicly-traded 
hospitality and tourism companies can not be justified on the grounds of overreaction. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE   
 
The hospitality and tourism firms listed on the JSE (Indonesia) had asynchronous trading 
which confounded the event analysis method.  The authors applied some filtering techniques to 
 12 
improve the reliability of the results.  However, event study analysis was not a viable option due 
to infrequency of trading of these stocks.  The JSE index lost 11.2% on the first trading day after 
terrorist attacks and the hospitality and tourism portfolio stocks’ value decreased by 2.67%.  
In the case of hospitality and tourism stocks in Turkey, the analysis produced mixed 
results. The market did not react to the first bombing which occurred on November 15, 2003.  
Whereas, the reaction on the day of the second bombing (Day 4) was much more severe.  Table 2 
shows that only two of the event days (2 and 4) recorded negative abnormal returns (ARs).  
However, the AR for Day 4 was fairly large (-7.62%) and significant at .05 level which resulted 
in negative CAR for the whole event period.  Yet, the CAR value for the event period was not 
significant at .05 level.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE   
                  
 The researchers checked whether the decrease in the market values of the Turkish 
hospitality and tourism stocks was due to overreaction.  As it can be seen in Figure 2,    
the return patterns of the CAR demonstrated some considerable swings in the post event period.  
For instance, on day 12 the holders of hospitality and tourism stocks recovered some of the 
losses they encountered.  Then however, on day 17 the significant drop occurred (-2.46%, 
t=2.06, sig. 05) which brought the CAR to a negative 4.27%.  Afterwards, the fluctuations in the 
abnormal returns continued; yet, the losses due to the terrorism bombings were never fully 
recovered.  This can be seen in the CAR on day 31 which was a negative 3.71%.  Thus, just like 
in the case of Spanish firms, the hospitality and tourism stocks were not subject to overreaction 
to the unanticipated event. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE   
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LIMITATIONS 
The results of this study should be interpreted with caution because both Spain and 
Turkey have low number of publicly traded hospitality and tourism stocks which may affect the 
robustness of results of an event study.  In addition, acknowledge the fact the occurrence of two 
back to back bombing events in Istanbul, Turkey may have confounded the analysis. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 Based on the findings of this study there is evidence that investors perceived hospitality 
and tourism stocks to be more vulnerable than that of the market index during the periods of 
terrorist attacks.  This provides a support to the long-standing view that the hospitality and 
tourism industry is sensitive to shocks of economic and non-economic nature.  Although findings 
in Turkey were slightly confounded by the second terrorist bombing, it is evident that investors’ 
reaction was more intense for the second bombing.  The results of this study can be useful for 
policy makers, investors, and executives of hospitality firms in assessing their future investment 
strategies in these countries.  However, one should keep in mind the difficulties of locating 
reliable data for the stock markets in emerging countries. 
The next step in this line of research would be to look into the stock returns of hospitality 
firms in neighboring and competing countries during the bombing events.  One may argue that 
investors in the competing countries (such as Greece, Italy and France) might also have reacted 
negatively on these bombings by being nervous about possible similar attacks on their own 
countries.  This view is supported by the raw stock returns reported by BBC News (2004b) 
during the second bombing in Istanbul, for European hospitality and tourism stocks were 
negative. Indeed, the authors of this paper conducted a preliminary cross-country analysis for 
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Turkey and Spain to check for this argument.  The findings revealed that in both of the cases –
that is, for the bombing in Spain and the subsequent reaction of Turkish hospitality and tourism 
stocks, and vice versa – the abnormal returns were not significant.  This provides a partial 
support to the perspective that investors focus on the country where the event has occurred rather 
than conjecturing about the spillover effect of the bombing in the neighboring/competing 
countries. 
 However, it should be noted that Turkey and Spain are not neighboring countries and 
thus, the occurrence of an event in one country did not have an affect on stocks in the other 
country. Yet, a competing hypothesis may be that hospitality and tourism stocks in the 
neighboring countries may record positive abnormal returns when bombings occur in the target 
countries.  In other words, it might be conjectured that bombings in Spain may result in positive 
gains in Italy and France because of the expectation that tourists canceling their trips to Spain 
may choose to visit other countries in the Mediterranean region that are in proximity to Spain.  
This can in turn increase the cash flows of the respective hospitality and tourism establishments 
in these countries (i.e. Italy and France).  Heretofore, this paper paves the way for this kind of 
empirical research for the near future. 
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Table 1 
 
Abnormal Return Statistics for Hospitality and Tourism Stocks (Spain) 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
AR=Abnormal Return, SE=Standard Error, CAR= Cumulative Abnormal Return 
         *Significant at .05 level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Day AR SE t(AR) CAR(0,t) t(CAR(0,t) 
0 -1.42% 0.5693% -2.49* -1.42% -2.49* 
1 -1.18% 0.5693% -2.08* -2.60% -3.23* 
2 -3.06% 0.5693% -5.37* -5.66% -5.74* 
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Figure 1 
 
                 Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Spain 
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Table 2 
 
Abnormal Return Statistics for Hospitality and Tourism Stocks (Turkey) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Notes: AR=Abnormal Return, SE=Standard Error, CAR= Cumulative Abnormal Return 
          *Significant at .05 level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Day AR SE t(AR) CAR(0,t) t(CAR(0,t) 
0 1.17% 1.67% 0.70 1.17% 0.70 
1 0.27% 1.67% 0.16 1.44% 0.61 
2 -0.27% 1.67%    -0.16 1.17% 0.41 
3 2.30% 1.67% 1.38 3.47% 1.04 
4 -7.62% 1.67%  -4.57 * -4.15% -1.11 
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Figure 2 
 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Turkey  
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